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Abstract Dogs can use the placement of an arbitrary
marker to locate hidden food in an object-choice situa-
tion. We tested domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) in three
studies aimed at pinning down the relative contributions of
the human’s hand and the marker itself. We baited one of
two cups (outside of the dogs’ view) and gave the dog a
communicative cue to find the food. Study 1 systematically
varied dogs’ perceptual access to the marker placing event,
so that dogs saw either the whole human, the hand only,
the marker only, or nothing. Follow-up trials investigated
the effect of removing the marker before the dog’s choice.
Dogs used the marker as a communicative cue even when
it had been removed prior to the dog’s choice and attached
more importance to this cue than to the hand that placed
it although the presence of the hand boosted performance
when it appeared together with the marker. Study 2 directly
contrasted the importance of the hand and the marker and
revealed that the effect of the marker diminished if it had
been associated with both cups. In contrast touching both
cups with the hand had no effect on performance. Study 3
investigated whether the means of marker placement (in-
tentional or accidental) had an effect on dogs’ choices.
Results showed that dogs did not differentiate intentional
and accidental placing of the marker. These results suggest
that dogs use the marker as a genuine communicative cue
quite independently from the experimenter’s actions.
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Introduction
Domestic dogs have evolved specialized cognitive skills
for reading human social-communicative signals. This is
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most readily apparent in the so-called object choice ex-
perimental paradigm in which a human hides food in
one of several distinct locations and then gives a signal
to indicate for the dog which one contains food—with
several different control procedures used to ensure that
subjects cannot locate the food without such a cue (e.g.,
by smell). In many different studies dogs have shown
the ability to use a number of different kinds of cues
to locate the hidden food at above chance levels (Hare
et al. 1998; Miklo´si et al. 1998; Hare and Tomasello 1999;
Agnetta et al. 2000; Soproni et al. 2001, 2002). These in-
clude such things as: (1) a human pointing to the target
location (including pointing with the opposite hand with
finger located at midline, equidistant from potential food
locations); (2) a human gazing to the target location (dog
either sees head turn or not); and (3) a human bowing or
nodding to the target location. Many dogs are even skill-
ful when a human walks toward an empty container while
pointing to the target container at a different location.
One especially important condition in one of these stud-
ies involved the use of an arbitrary marker. Agnetta et al.
(2000) indicated the location of the hidden food for dogs
by placing a small sponge in front of the container with
food. This is an especially important condition for two rea-
sons. First, the cue is totally novel. Thus, while it is easy
to imagine that dogs could have evolved specialized skills
for following human pointing and eye gaze direction in
various contexts—as in the majority of conditions in object
choice studies—it is much less easy to imagine them evolv-
ing skills related specifically to physical markers. Second,
great apes consistently have difficulties in using a physi-
cal marker to locate hidden food (Tomasello et al. 1997).
Indeed, Hare et al. (2002) directly compared chimpanzees
and domestic dogs in this task and found that domestic
dogs were much superior. Even young dog puppies with
very little human experience were successful in the task,
whereas adult wolves were not—suggesting that dogs’ spe-
cial skills, however they might be characterized, evolved
during the domestication process.
The question thus arises how dogs understand and use
an arbitrary marker as a cue to food’s location. The study
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of Agnetta et al. (2000) actually had 4 different conditions
involving a marker. In one the dog watched the human
place the marker in front of the target location, with the
human looking at the location as she placed the marker
(Place + Gaze). In another the dog watched the human
placing the marker, but in this case the human stared straight
ahead as she placed it (Place Only). In another the human
raised an occluder before placing the marker so that the
dog saw the following sequence: occluder raised; human
holds up marker above occluder for dog to see; human
lowers marker and places it on target location, with the
dog not able to see the placement process (dog only sees
human head and shoulders; no arm, hand, or marker during
placement) (Occlude Placing). Dogs were above chance in
locating the food in all of these conditions.
The fourth condition was a bit different. In this condition
the dog was out of the room while the human placed the
marker. When the dog entered the room it simply saw two
containers, one with a sponge in front of it (human sitting
behind the two containers, as in all of the other conditions).
Dogs were administered this Marker Only condition two
times: once before they started with the other conditions
and once after they had completed them. Dogs performed
at chance levels in this task at both administrations. One
interpretation would be that this poor performance actually
indicates that dogs understand the communicative signifi-
cance of the marker. That is, they understand the sponge as
a communicative sign when they observe a human use it in
the proper context, but when they simply see it sitting in
front of a container—without having seen a human place
it—the sponge has no communicative significance. Another
interpretation would be that this poor performance indicates
that dogs do not really understand the communicative sig-
nificance of the marker because, since this was a within
subject design and dogs also experienced the Marker Only
condition again at the end of the study, they knew that
the game was that the human would give some sign to help
them find the food—and so seeing the human actually place
the sponge should be unnecessary.
It thus seems that dogs in this task need to know that a
human placed the marker in order to see it as a communica-
tively significant sign. But note that in the Occlude Placing
condition they did not actually observe the placing process
either; they simply observed the human hold up the sponge
for them and then perhaps move her shoulders in some
subtle ways—and then they saw the marker in front of one
of two buckets. Their good performance in this condition
apparently means that this was sufficient information to in-
dicate that the human had placed the marker (for them). An
interesting set of questions thus arise around the issue of
what human behavior dogs need to experience in associa-
tion with the marker before they see the placement process
as a communicative sign indicating the food’s location. For
example, it would be interesting to know how dogs would
do in this task if they simply saw a hand place the marker
without seeing any other parts of the human’s body. Further,
would they see the marker as a communicatively significant
sign if the human placed it on a bucket but then removed
it before they had to choose (a condition that would also
test whether they are simply attracted to the marker)? Also
interesting is the question of what dogs would infer if the
human actually touched both locations but left the marker
on only one—so that the placement of the marker is ob-
served but it in a sense competes with a simple touching
cue (which has been shown in other studies to be effective;
Hare et al. 2002). Finally, it would also be interesting to
know if the way in which the human places the marker is
important, with special reference to the issue of whether the
human places it intentionally or by accident (see Call and
Tomasello 1998, for a similar study with apes and human
children).
The current study, therefore, comprises three experiments
with dogs using the object choice paradigm with a marker.
In the first we systematically varied dogs’ perceptual access
to the event of the human placing the marker, such that
sometimes the dog saw only the hand doing the placing or
just the face/shoulders of the human and so forth. We also
sometimes removed the marker before the dog chose, to see
if the marking process retained its communicative import
even without the physical marker. In the second study the
human touched both hiding locations, in turn, leaving the
marker either on the first one touched or the second one
touched, enabling us to determine if the marker provided
the dogs with information above and beyond the human’s
behavior. And in the third study we placed the marker on
both containers before the dog chose (removing it before the
choice)—with one of the placements occurring accidentally
(“Whoops!”) and the other occurring intentionally (“Ja!”).
Study 1: Different parts of the marking process visible
Methods
Subjects
Sixty-four domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) of various
breeds and ages participated in the study. There were
36 females and 28 males that ranged in age from 9 months
to 11 years (mean=4.35 yrs, SD=2.46 yrs). Just under half
the dogs were mongrels, and most of the others were some
breed of working dog (herding, hunting, and others). All
dogs were recruited by phone from owners in a medium-
sized German city. Some dogs had participated in previous
experiments, but none using markers.
During the study we recruited more than 64 dogs to main-
tain a good sample size and some dogs would not perform
the test. Fewer than four dogs did not pass the warm-up,
so they never started with the experimental conditions. For
each condition we had fewer than 5 dogs which passed
the warm-up but then after some trials simply did not per-
form anymore, due to the lack of attention and less food
motivation.
Procedure
Testing was done during September and October 2002 in a
quiet room of approximately 10 m2, without owners being
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present. The basic task had the same structure in all four
experimental conditions. On each trial, one experimenter
(E1) stood behind the dog and held it by the collar, with
its two forelegs on a marked spot 1.5 m in front of the
test table. A second experimenter (E2) sat behind this table
on a small stool 25 cm high and prepared for the coming
trial by showing a piece of food (dog treat) to the subject,
raising a horizontal barrier (120×45 cm) in front of the
table, and then behind this barrier hiding the treat under
one of two identical plastic cups (red coloured, d=8.5 cm,
h=8 cm). The cups were placed on the table 90 cm apart
and turned upside down so that the dogs could not see the
food. To equalize the olfactory cues potentially provided
by the food inside the cups, both cups had been in contact
with food pieces before the experiment began.
Each dog participated first in five warm-up trials in which
it observed E2 hiding the food, and then was released to
make its choice. Virtually all dogs met the criterion of 4
of 5 correct immediately; the few who did not were given
additional warm-up trials until they got four out of five
consecutive trials correct. After this warm-up phase, testing
proper began. E2 showed a piece of food to the subject and
called its name to get the subject’s attention, then E2 hid
the reward under one of the cups. The piece of food was
placed in the middle of the table and both cups were moved
towards the food, but only one cup captured the food and
dragged to its final destination. Than E2 administered one
of the four following conditions (see Fig. 1):
All. E2 lowered the horizontal barrier and obtained the
dog’s attention by showing it a marker (black and white
colored piece of wood, 11×7×3 cm). He then placed
the marker on top of the cup with food, looking to the
cup as he placed the marker.
Hand only. E2 lowered the horizontal barrier, but then
put up another one that hid his entire body and the
middle part of the table (vertical barrier, 90×53 cm).
The dog could thus see only the two ends of the table
with the cups on top of them (26 cm on each side of the
table). Then, without showing the marker to the dog
and without obtaining the dog’s attention, E2 placed
the marker on top of the cup with food. All that the dog
saw was a hand emerging from behind the barrier and
placing the marker, but not E2’s gaze direction.
Marker only. E2 did not immediately lower the horizon-
tal barrier used to occlude the hiding process. With
the horizontal barrier still up, E2 obtained the dog’s
attention by showing it the marker, and then placed
the marker on top of the cup with food, looking to the
cup as he placed the marker. The dog was unable to
see either the cups or the actual marker placement. It
could only see the gaze cue of the experimenter and the
movement of his shoulder.
Nothing. E2 did not immediately lower the horizontal
barrier used to occlude the hiding process, and without
obtaining the dog’s attention he also raised the vertical
barrier that occluded him as well. Thus, the dog was
unable to see any element of the placement process
except the marker on top of the cup after E2 lowered
the two barriers.
After E2 had given his cue, he resumed a waiting position,
looking straight ahead and E1 released the dog to make its
choice.
Condition “marker only” Condition “nothing”
vertical
barrier
vertical
barrier
Condition “hand only” Condition “all”
horizontal barrier horizontal barrier
Fig. 1 Graphic depiction
showing the experimental set-up
of the four conditions in study 1
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The experimental design was between-subjects, with
16 subjects randomly assigned to each of the four con-
ditions. Each subject received 18 trials in its assigned con-
dition, all in a single session (with a short break after 12
trials). The side on which the food was hidden was semi-
randomized, with the stipulation that it never occurred more
than twice in a row on the same side. After these 18 trials,
an additional experimental manipulation was introduced.
Each subject received six additional trials in each of the
four conditions mentioned above except that E2 removed
the marker from the cup after 3 s had elapsed since its
placement, these were called ‘marker gone’ (at the time of
the dogs choice) trials. This means that dogs always saw
the hand removing the marker from the baited cup and E2
looking at the cup while the removal took place. The dog
was released only after this removal, and so its choice was
made with no cue immediately available.
As in previous studies, dogs almost always made their
choices immediately by approaching one of the cups and
nudging it with the nose. Since choices were totally unam-
biguous, scoring was done simply by the two experimenters
agreeing on the choice and writing it down on the spot (in
past studies of this type inter-observer reliabilities have al-
ways approached 100%). If the dog chose the correct cup, it
was allowed to eat the food; if it chose the incorrect cup, E2
took the food from the correct cup with the dog watching
and put it back in a bag.
We used ANOVA and t-test to make comparisons across
conditions and one-sample t-tests (with 50% expected
probability) to assess the deviation from chance respond-
ing. All tests were two-tailed.
Results
Figure 2 shows the mean percent correct responses in
both the 18 ‘marker present’ experimental trials and the
six ‘marker gone’ (at the time of the dogs choice) experi-
mental trials. For the ‘marker present’ experimental trials,
each condition was first compared to chance. All condi-
tions except the ‘Marker Only’ condition (t (15)=2.09,
p=0.055) were above chance (All: t (15)=9.32, p<0.001;
Hand Only: t (15)=8.20, p<0.001; Nothing: t (15)=2.38,
p=0.031). The analysis of the effect size for the ‘marker
only’ condition shows a Cohen‘s medium effect (d=0.52),
so with a sample size of 16 subjects we can not detect
significance.
These four conditions may be characterized by the fac-
torial combination of two factors: whether or not the dog
can see the hand and whether or not the dog can see the hu-
man’s body and gaze as he places the marker [All = ++;
Hand Only = +−; Marker Only = −+; Nothing = −].
To compare these factors and their possible interaction, an
overall 2 (hand: visible/not visible) × 2 (body: visible/not
visible) ANOVA was conducted. The only effect found was
for visibility of the hand, F (1,15)=80.91, p<0.001. Dogs
performed significantly better when they could see the hand
placing the marker.
In the ‘marker gone’ experimental trials, all conditions
were higher than would be expected by chance (All: t
(15)=6.58, p<0.001; Hand Only: t (15)=3.62, p=0.003;
Marker Only: t (15)=2.78, p=0.014; Nothing t (15)=3.58,
p=0.003). An overall 2 (hand: visible/not visible) × 2
(body: visible/not visible) ANOVA revealed no significant
main effects or interactions. To compare the two types of
experimental trials (‘marker present’ and ‘marker gone’
at the time of the subjects choice) we conducted a re-
peated measurement ANOVA with the following factors:
2 (hand: visible/not visible) × 2 (body: visible/not visible)
× 2 (marker: ‘marker present’ trials/‘marker gone’ trials).
There was a significant main effect for the visibility of the
hand, F (1,15)=24.87, p<0.001, and a significant hand x
marker interaction, F (1,15)=5.75, p=0.03, such that the
visibility of the hand was more important in the ‘marker
present’ than in the ‘marker gone’ trials. There were no
other reliable main effects or interactions.
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To test for learning during the experiment, the first six
trials of the ‘marker present’ experimental conditions were
compared to the last six trials using a paired t-test for each
condition. No significant effects were found (no test statis-
tic above 1).
We conducted first trial analyses for the four ‘marker
present’ conditions together, 43 dogs were correct in their
first choice, 21 subjects were wrong. A binomial test
against chance (Probability =0.5) showed a significant ef-
fect N=64 p=0.008.
There were also no reliable differences due to breed or
sex.
Discussion
In this study, dogs used basically all of the marker-based
cues to find the hidden food. When the marker stayed on
the cup, they used 3 of the 4 cues. The non significant
‘Marker Only’ cue was when the dog saw the experimenter
hold up the food to begin the trial, did not witness the
hiding process (though it did see E2 hold up the marker
and look in a direction behind the occluder), but only saw
the marker on the cup when it came time to choose. But
a very similar cue was effective in the study of Agnetta
et al. (2000), and the same exact cue was effective in the
current study when the experimenter removed the marker
before the moment of choice in the ‘marker gone’ trials.
In general, then, the basic finding is that dogs were skillful
with all of the marker-based cues.
This was even true of the condition ‘Nothing’ in which
the dog did not witness any part of the hiding process (e.g.,
did not see E2 hold up the marker or look in any direction),
but had information only at the very end as it saw the
marker on top of the cup. In a similar condition, Agnetta
et al. (2000) found chance performance in dogs. The main
difference is that in that study the dog was out of the room
both during the baiting process and when the experimenter
placed the marker—and so did not see E2 with the food
at all. One interpretation of the discrepancy between these
findings is that in the current study, dogs always saw E2 in
his place behind the table, with food, at the beginning of the
trial, and so when they saw the marker on the cup inferred
that he had placed it—whereas in the Agnetta et al. (2000)
study this inference was more difficult because dogs were
not even in the room when the baiting and marking took
place.
One could argue that successful performance may be
based on using the experimenter’s gaze. However, this was
not the case because there was also a high performance in
the ‘Hand Only’ and ‘Nothing’ conditions in which dogs
were prevented from seeing the experimenter’s gaze direc-
tion. Alternatively, one could argue that dogs based their
decision on the auditory cue produced by the placement
of the marker. However, recall that the marker was placed
carefully and had a padded surface to prevent the produc-
tion of auditory cues. More importantly, the presence of
auditory cues would not explain the observed differences
across conditions because the marker placement was iden-
tical in all conditions.
Comparison among the cues revealed that the very best
conditions were ones in which the dog could see the hand
placing the marker on the cup, and this was especially
so when the marker remained on the cup at the time of
choice (interaction between hand and marker in the overall
ANOVA). One possible reason for this interaction is that
in the conditions in which the marker was gone at the
moment of choice, the dog always witnessed the removal
process and so in this case the hand went to the correct cup
(to remove the marker) just before the dog chose. So it is
possible that the hand is important in these conditions as
well.
In general, it is important that removing the marker before
the dog chose overall had no detrimental effect on perfor-
mance. This is a crucial point because it demonstrates very
clearly that dog’s behavior in these tasks did not derive from
their attraction to the marker itself. Nevertheless, given that
the dog saw the removal process, it is true that of the eight
experimental conditions in the study as a whole, the dog
saw the hand with a marker in it on top of the correct cup
(either placing or removing) in six of these. Interestingly,
the two conditions in which dogs did not see this config-
uration (‘Nothing’ and ‘Marker Only’ in main trials) were
the two lowest conditions numerically.
It thus seems plausible that attention to both the marker
and hand contributed to dogs’ success in this experiment.
In a second experiment, therefore, we attempted to assess
dogs’ understanding of the marker independent of the hand
by having the experimenter always touch both cups during
the marking process, but then leave the marker on top of
only one of them.
Study 2: The role of the marker
Methods
Subjects
Sixteen domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) of various breeds
and ages participated in this study. There were 7 males
and 9 females that ranged in age from one to nine years
(mean=3.5 yrs, SD=2.25 yrs). About one-third of the dogs
were mongrels, and most of the others were some breed of
working dog (herding, hunting, and others). Again dogs
were recruited by phone from owners in a medium-sized
German city. None of the dogs had participated in the first
study.
Procedure
Testing was done between January and April 2003 in the
same room as the first study, without owners present. The
warm-up trials were conducted exactly as in the first study.
The basic procedure of the experimental trials and the ma-
terials were the same as in the first study also: E2 showed
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the dog the food to get its attention, hid the food in one
of two cups behind a barrier, lowered the barrier, gave a
cue, and then gave the dog a chance to choose a cup. What
differed, of course, were the two experimental conditions:
Marker vs. hand. After baiting E2 lowered the barrier
obtained the dog’s attention by showing it the marker.
He then placed the marker on top of the cup with food,
looking to the cup as he placed the marker. Leaving the
marker in its place, he then briefly touched the other
cup on its top and looked at it. After placement, he
resumed a waiting position, looking straight ahead.
Marker touches both. After baiting E2 lowered the bar-
rier, obtained the dog’s attention by showing it the
marker, and then briefly touched the top of the cup
without food using the marker, and then the cup with
food, looking at both cups as he placed the marker.
Leaving the marker there, he resumed a waiting posi-
tion, looking straight ahead.
The experimental design was within-subjects, with each
subject receiving 4 trials in each condition, all in a single
session. The order of conditions was randomized and the
side on which the food was hidden was semi-randomized,
with the stipulation that no condition or side ever occurred
more than twice in a row. Scoring was done by the two
experimenters agreeing on the choice and writing it down
on the spot. If the dog chose the correct cup, it was allowed
to eat the food; if it chose the incorrect cup, E2 took the
food with the dog watching and put it back in a bag. We
analyzed the data as in the previous study.
Results
Table 1 shows the number correct (out of 4) in each condi-
tion for each subject.
Table 1 Number of trials correct (out of 4) for each subject in each
condition
Subject Breed Both marked Marker vs. Hand
Lisa Border Collie 3 4
Sunny G. Retriever 2 3
Ronja G. Retriever 2 2
Charly G. Retriever 2 2
Toby G. Retriever 2 3
Ricky G. Retriever 2 3
Bajinia Ridgeback 3 2
Ambula Ridgeback 1 4
Willy Boxer 2 3
Balou Schapendoes 2 4
Sally Terrier 1 2
Akira Mongrel 2 3
Lotte Mongrel 2 2
Tina Mongrel 2 2
Tina2 Mongrel 2 2
Winnie Mongrel 1 4
Total 1,94 48,44% 2,82 70,31%
The ‘Marker vs. Hand’ condition significantly dif-
fered from chance, t (15)=3.90, p=0.001 whereas the
‘Marker Touches Both’ condition did not, t (15)=0.44,
p=0.669. Moreover, dogs performed significantly better in
the ‘Marker vs. Hand’ condition compared to the ‘Marker
Touches Both’ condition, t (15)=3.22, p=0.006. No sig-
nificant effects were found for breed or sex.
Discussion
Dogs again seemed most strongly influenced by seeing
the hand with the marker in it on top of the cup. Thus,
in the ‘Marker vs. Hand’ condition, they saw the marker in
the hand only on top of the correct cup, and so they
were quite good (correct over 70% of the time), ignoring
the empty hand touching the other cup. In contrast,
in the ‘Marker Touches Both’ condition in which they saw
the marker in the hand on top of both cups in turn, they
performed at chance (48%)—even though the marker was
sitting on the correct cup at the moment of choice. One
could argue that successful performance in the ‘Marker
vs. Hand’ condition was caused by a primacy effect, that
is, dogs targeted the cup where the marker first rested on.
However, this would not explain the chance performance in
the ‘Marker Touches Both’ condition. Indeed, a primacy ef-
fect would have produced a below chance performance, not
the observed chance performance, because the cup marked
first was always incorrect in this condition. It thus seems,
once again, that neither the marker by itself, the hand by
itself or some primacy effect is sufficient to explain these
findings, but rather dogs are looking to see the human place
the marker. In the next study we investigated how sensitive
dogs were to the way the marker was deposited on the cup.
Study 3: Purposeful vs accidental placing
The first two studies concerned where the marker was
placed and what the dog could see of the placing process.
The third study, modeled on that of Call and Tomasello
(1998) with apes, concerned the manner in which the
marker was placed—either deliberately or by accident.
Methods
Subjects
The same dogs that participated in Study 2 also participated
in Study 3, after an approximately 15 min break.
Procedure
The basic procedure was the same as in the first two stud-
ies: E2 showed the dog the food to get its attention, hid the
food in one of two cups behind a barrier, lowered the bar-
rier, gave a cue, and then gave the dog a chance to choose
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a cup. The apparatus and, of course, the experimental con-
ditions were different. On the table, behind each cup (from
the subject’s point of view), was a small “tower”, approx-
imately 5 cm taller than the top of the cup. After baiting
the cups E2 lowered the barrier, obtained the dog’s atten-
tion by showing it the marker. The marker for the study
was a small beanbag toy. The beanbag was placed on the
tower behind a cup, and E2 then either pushed it onto the
cup with one finger purposefully—saying: “Ja!” (german
word for yes) while directing his body and gaze towards
the marker and the cup, or turned his head away from the
marker and towards the ground (with sides randomized)
and “accidentally” raised/bumped the table with his knees
so that the beanbag fell off the tower onto the cup—saying
“Whoops!” as an additional cue to the purpose of the ac-
tion. There were two conditions depending on the order of
the type of marking:
Intention First. E2 placed the marker deliberately on top
of the cup with food, paused, removed it, and then
knocked it “accidentally” onto the other cup, and re-
moved it (into his lap beneath the table).
Accident First. E2 knocked the marker “accidentally” on
top of the cup with food, paused, removed it, and then
placed it deliberately on the other cup, and removed it
(into his lap beneath the table).
After this, E2 resumed a waiting position, looking straight
ahead, and E1 released the dog to make a choice. Thus, for
each trial the marker was placed, in turn, on both cups, once
accidentally and once purposefully, and always removed
before the dog made its choice.
The experimental design was within-subjects, with each
subject receiving 4 trials in each condition, all in a sin-
gle session. The order of conditions was counterbalanced
across subjects, and the side on which the food was hidden
was semi-randomized such that no side ever occurred more
than twice in a row. The scoring procedure and statistical
analyses were the same as those in the previous studies.
Results
The dogs in this study did not choose the cup marked in-
tentionally at greater than chance levels (mean = 4.4 out
of 8), t (15)=1.46, p=0.16. The dogs were not choosing
randomly, however. Rather, they selected the cup marked
last significantly more often than the cup marked first,
(mean last=4.75, SE=0.27; mean first=3.25, SE=0.27)
t (15)=2.82, p=0.013. Finally, we analysed the results of
the dogs‘ first choice, so the first accident that happens
for the subject, 8 dogs were correct and 8 dogs were not,
there is no tendency that the dogs perform better in the first
accident that happens.
Discussion
In this study dogs saw the marker being placed on both
cups before they made their choice. The question was
whether they would pay attention to the manner in which
that placing was conducted, either intentionally or acci-
dentally. They did not, but rather they simply went for the
last cup marked. It would thus seem that, using the cur-
rent methodology at least, dogs do not distinguish between
intentional and accidental actions.
It is not clear why they chose to go for the last cup
marked. One possible explanation is that the trial took some
time to execute, what with placement, removal, placement,
removal. And so, given that the dogs were not good at
distinguishing the different types of placing, they just went
for the most salient cue, the last one seen.
General discussion
The current studies succeeded in outlining some of the pa-
rameters of dogs’ performance in using the marker as a
communicative cue. In particular, they allowed us to pin
down the relative contributions of the human’s hand and
the marker in a communicative situation. The first study
showed that dogs performed better when seeing the hand
place the marker than seeing the marker alone. Neverthe-
less, dogs were able to use the marker both without seeing
the actual placing or with the marker absent at the time of
choice.
The second study served to reinforce the importance of
the marker independent from the hand. Dogs selected the
correct cup with the marker on top even if both cups had
been touched by the hand before the choice, but they did
not do so if the marker (and the hand) had visited both
cups. The third study confirmed this result by showing that
subjects were unable to choose the correct cup when the
marker had been on both cups and the hand had only been
involved in the placement on one of them.
Looking at the data across studies revealed that dogs
succeeded in those conditions in which only one of the
two cups had been associated with the marker (i.e., study
1: all conditions, study 2: ‘Marker vs. Hand’) but failed
those conditions in which the marker had been associated
with both cups (study 2: ‘Marker Touches Both’, study
3: both conditions). In contrast, the involvement of the
hand did not have such an effect on performance. Dogs
succeeded in some conditions when the hand was directed
to a single cup only (study 1) but failed in others (study 3).
Similarly, dogs passed some conditions in which the hand
was directed to both cups (study 2: ‘Hand vs. Marker’)
but failed others (‘Marker Touches Both’). This means that
dogs were attaching more importance to the marker than
to the hand that placed the marker, although the presence
of the hand could boost performance when it appeared
together with the marker in one cup (study 1).
The most fundamental question arising from dogs’ gener-
ally excellent performance in using a marker to find hidden
food is whether they actually understand this cue commu-
nicatively, or whether, alternatively, they are succeeding in
some other way. Control conditions in previous studies have
demonstrated conclusively that they are not using smell
(e.g., Hare et al. 1998; Agnetta et al. 2000). The ‘marker
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gone’ trials in the first of the current studies demonstrated
further that they are not simply attracted to the current
physical presence of the marker and that the dogs do not
need the presence of the marker to choose correctly.
Moreover, when the marker was present they directed
their actions to the cup, not to the marker. In fact, we have
not observed any difference in the way dogs behave when
those have been single out by the marker or by a pointing
gesture.
Neither in this study nor in other studies do dogs need
time to learn to use the marker as a discriminative cue, as
they are skillful from the very first trials. So, on the face of
it, dogs seem to understand the marker as a communicative
cue.
Previous studies have shown that dogs are very good
at using such direct human communicative behaviors
as pointing and looking as cues that indicate for them
the location of hidden food, and they are good at this
even as young puppies when they have had varied little
opportunity to learn such things from their interactions
with humans (Hare et al. 2002). It is thus possible that
dogs have evolved an adaptive specialization for reading
human directional behaviors, such as looking and pointing,
and these accounts for their good performance. But the
physical marker, as used in the current study, is a novel
communicative cue for which no plausible evolutionary
story can be told. This means that dogs’ adaptation,
whatever it may be precisely, supports very general skills
of reading human communicative behavior—even when
they must do this indirectly by inferring that the human
has placed a marker on an important location.
Comparing our current results on the use of the marker to
those of previous studies with children and apes suggests
that dogs and 30- to 36-month-old human children can use
novel cues that they have had no previous opportunity to
learn in this same way, whereas the same is not true for
chimpanzees and orangutans (Tomasello et al. 1997). Note
that all great apes that had been trained on the marker in
a previous task performed at above chance levels whereas
the untrained apes performed at chance level. This poor
performance occurred even though they were tested under
conditions similar to the “all” condition in the current study,
which was the easiest condition for dogs. Future studies
could investigate how children and trained apes react to the
presentation of partial information regarding the placement
of the marker as we did in this study for dogs. Another
avenue of future inquiry is to investigate the ways in which
dogs do and do not use other kinds of novel human-given
communicative cues. Especially important would be testing
the skills of human-naive puppies’ in the use of gestures
such as pointing and arbitrary cues such as the marker to
see how the different types of cues appear during ontogeny.
This study confirmed previous findings showing that
dogs are capable of using an arbitrary marker as a
communicative cue (Agnetta et al. 2000; Hare et al. 2002).
The two conditions that are problematic to some degree
are: (1) the ‘Nothing’ condition in the ‘marker present’
trials, which was just above chance in the current study,
but in a slightly altered form was at chance in the Agnetta
et al. study; (2) the ‘Marker Only’ condition in the ‘marker
present’ trials which was at chance level in the current
study (although in a slightly altered form above chance
in the Agnetta et al. study). It is likely that in this first of
these conditions the way the cue was given in the current
study was more informative than in the Agnetta et al. study
in which the dog was out of the room for the entire baiting
and marking process. In the second of these, it is not clear
if perhaps there was some subtle difference between the
current study and the Agnetta et al. study (e.g., a slightly
higher or lower barrier) that might have provided less
information here. In any case, the current hypothesis is that
to the degree that a dog was able to infer from observed
information (they saw the human with the food, the raising
of the barriers and the marker on the cup) that the human
had placed the marker, to that degree was it successful.
Information about the removal process also helped boost
dogs’ performance to some degree in Study 1 (and it may
have also played a role in our inability to find significant
differences between a marker placed on the correct cup
deliberately and one placed there accidentally). However,
negative results are never definitive, and so since this is
the first study of its kind—we know of no other studies
specifically testing whether dogs discriminate intentional
actions from other kinds of actions—we can only say that
in the current study dogs did not seem to make this discrim-
ination. Interestingly, great apes in the study of Call and
Tomasello (1998) did make this discrimination, and in the
study of Call (2004) they used various physical/causal cues
(e.g., noises) to infer where hidden food might be. But in
other studies, great apes do not use a human-placed marker
as a communicative cue indicating the location of hidden
food (see Call and Tomasello 2003, for a review, and Hare
et al. 2002, for a direct comparison between the species).
One possibility is that great apes have mainly evolved skills
for making inferences about their causal and social worlds,
whereas dogs have been specifically selected during the
domestication process to be sensitive to human-produced
communicative cues (see Bra¨uer et al. submitted, for some
suggestive evidence in this direction).
In conclusion, dogs used an arbitrary marker as a com-
municative cue. They attached more importance to this cue
than to the hand that placed the marker, although the pres-
ence of the hand boosted performance when it appeared
together with the marker and the marker was not associ-
ated with the other cup.
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